


























Alan S. Blinder 
Princeton University 
 















Acknowledgements: This paper is a longer version of the keynote lecture at the Norges Bank 
research workshop “Monetary Policy Committees,” Oslo, September 6-7, 2007. I am grateful to 
my colleague Chris Sims for helpful comments and to the Center for Economic Policy Studies for 
supporting my research in this area.   1
As the opening speaker, I may perhaps be permitted a short trip down memory lane. 
The trip is purposeful, and it will be mercifully short.  
While preparing my Marshall Lectures for delivery at Cambridge in 1995, I asked 
the Federal Reserve staff, for I was then Vice Chairman, to research what had been 
written about monetary policymaking by committees—as opposed to by individuals. 
Although they were (and remain) a knowledgeable and thorough bunch, they unearthed 
almost nothing. So when I subsequently delivered the Robbins Lectures at the London 
School of Economics the following year,
1 this is what I concluded on the subject: 
My own hunch is that, on balance, the additional monetary policy inertia 
imparted by group decisionmaking provides a net benefit to society… But my 
main point is simpler: My experience as a member of the FOMC left me with 
a strong feeling that the theoretical fiction that monetary policy is made by a 
single individual maximizing a well-defined preference function misses 
something important. In my view, monetary theorists should start paying 
some attention to the nature of decisionmaking by committee, which is rarely 
mentioned in the academic literature. (Blinder, 1998, p. 22) 
 
I made reference in that lecture to only one paper on the subject,  Faust’s (1996) clever 
model of the seemingly-odd construction of the FOMC, though I should have cited 
Waller (1992) as well. (Mea culpa.) My point is that there had been hardly any research 
on committee decisionmaking by that time. 
Fortunately, that is no longer so. By the time of my 2002 Okun lectures at Yale, 
published as Blinder (2004), the subject merited a whole lecture, including references to 
about ten papers on the subject—and I know I missed some. The literature has continued 
to grow since then, including seven papers at the Netherlands Central Bank’s conference 
in 2005 and the eleven papers prepared for this conference. The study of central banking 
by committee thus appears to be a growth industry, albeit a small one. 
                                                 
1 These were eventually published as Blinder (1998).   2
In this short paper, I try to take stock of what we think we know—and what we do 
not know—about several questions that have been asked in this still-very-young 
literature. I also pose a few new questions. My jumping off point is two facts. 
1. There is an unmistakable trend toward making monetary policy decisions by 
committee rather than by individuals (Blinder, 2004, Chapter 2), which suggests 
that committee decisions are, for some reason(s), perceived to be superior.  
2. Monetary policy committees (MPCs) come in a wide variety of shapes and 
sizes, suggesting either that (a) the principal determinants of optimal committee 
design have yet to be pinned down or that (b) some of these determinants vary 
across nations. 
     Regarding Fact #1, the choices made by a number of countries in the last 15 years or 
so indicates an evolving consensus that (a) the committee-versus-individual choice 
matters for monetary policy and (b) committees make superior decisions, on average. But 
Fact #2 reveals that there is as yet no consensus on a host of important design issues. So I 
begin with #1 and then proceed to #2. 
 
1. Are committee decisions different? Better? 
Do the decisions of monetary policy committees differ systematically from the 
decisions of individual central bankers? Notice that my opening quotation strongly 
suggested that they do and that, in particular, committee-based decisions are more inertial 
and, for that reason, possibly better. But is it true? 
Subsequent experimental research by John Morgan and me (Blinder and Morgan, 
2005, 2007) has been kinder to the last part of this presumption than to the first. In two   3
different experiments, one with 100 Princeton University students and the other with 252 
University of California, Berkeley students, we found clear evidence that committees (of 
sizes 4, 5, and 8) outperform individual decisionmakers in making simulated monetary 
policy. So did Lombardelli et al. (2005) in a near-replication of our work using students 
at the London School of Economics.  
However, it does not appear that committees acquire their edge by being more 
inertial, as I had suggested back in 1996. In fact, the most stunning finding of Blinder and 
Morgan (2005), which was replicated in Blinder and Morgan (2007), is that committees 
do not react more slowly (nor more quickly) to demand shocks than individuals do. 
Instead, the reason for their superior performance is that they make fewer mistakes—
without taking longer to reach decisions.
2 One strong suggestion coming from the 
experimental results is that there are genuine gains from group interaction. Committees 
do not just reflect the average opinions of their members. Nor do they simply follow the 
median voter rule. Nor are they dominated by their most skilled members.
3 Instead, the 
group seems to foster some sort of collective wisdom that makes the whole a bit greater 
than the sum of its parts. 
Anne Sibert (2006) has recently disputed this conclusion, at least conceptually. She 
suggests two reasons why committees in general, and MPCs in particular, might 
underperform individual decisionmakers. One is free-riding on the public-goods nature of 
macroeconomic information, or what psychologists call “social loafing”—letting 
someone else do the work. The other is what is commonly called “group-think.” 
                                                 
2 “Longer” in this context refers to how much data the decisionmaker requires before changing interest 
rates, not to the number of minutes of clock time that elapse in the experiment. We judged this to be the 
more relevant concept of time lag in the monetary policy context. Who really cares how many minutes the 
MPC meeting lasts? 
3 These are three findings from Blinder and Morgan (2005).   4
Doubtless, there are many areas in which social loafing on a committee is 
important—just think of the work of any faculty committee. But, in my view, it strains 
credulity to apply this idea to a monetary policy committee, which is typically the most 
important duty that each committee member has in his or her professional life. Rather 
than fostering social loafing, life on a MPC seems more likely to create an atmosphere in 
which one-upmanship is the order of the day. In my personal experience on the FOMC, 
members prepared assiduously for each meeting in order to make the most telling points 
and thereby, hopefully, to influence the opinions of other committee members—or at 
least to sound smart. 
Group-think is less easily dismissed. Sibert (2006) quotes disapprovingly my 
hunches that committees “laboriously aggregate individual preferences; that they need to 
be led; that they tend to adopt compromise positions on difficult questions” (Blinder, 
1998, p. 20)—all of which suggest that committees moderate the possibly-extreme views 
of individual members. Instead, she observes, group-think can sometimes lead 
committees to decisions that no one would call moderate—as numerous military and 
foreign-policy misadventures attest. There are, no doubt, examples of group-think in 
monetary policy. Alan Greenspan (but not, it seems, Ben Bernanke) certainly encouraged 
it on the FOMC; and some of us have a hard time believing that all 19 members of the 
ECB Governing Council always agree on everything. But, that said, I have a hard time 
thinking of examples in which group-think led a central bank to pursue horrendous 
monetary policy.
4 
                                                 
4 Some might claim that the inflationary policies followed by the Federal Reserve before Paul Volcker were 
an example of harmful group-think. But other central bankers, acting as individuals, were making similar 
mistakes at the same time. Nor were the attitudes of the pre-Volcker FOMC out of step with contemporary 
received wisdom.    5
So I am not persuaded that we should let Sibert’s a priori arguments trump the 
experimental evidence to the contrary—not to mention the perceived successes of the 
Federal Open Market Committee, the former Bundesbank Council, and the ECB 
Governing Council. 
If committees really do outperform individuals, where and how do they acquire their 
edge? In Blinder (2004, Chapter 2), I suggested four main avenues: 
1.  Policy made by a committee is apt to be less volatile. That argument, 
however, is not borne out by the experimental evidence. 
2.  Committees are less likely to adopt extreme positions, Sibert’s group-think 
hypothesis notwithstanding. 
3.  A committee pools the knowledge of its members, leading to better decisions. 
4.  Committee members bring different ways of processing information 
(decision heuristics) to the table, which benefits the group. 
Without conceding the point on #2, I am inclined to put the greatest weight on #3 
and especially #4. Economists like to think of central bankers as minimizing a well-
defined (and quadratic!) social loss function subject to a known (at least up to stochastic 
elements) model of the economy that is stationary. But each of the three italicized words 
in this sentence is wildly at variance with reality. No one really knows the loss function, 
and committee members may not agree on it.
5 Certainly, MPC members do not know—
nor even think they know—the true model of the economy. Nor, when pressed, would 
anyone really defend the stationarity assumption. Ill-defined optimization problems with 
unknown objective functions and unknown (and possibly changing) constraints do not 
lend themselves to classical optimization techniques, nor to perfect solutions. Rather, 
                                                 
5 Eliminating the possibility of disagreements over goals is one of the arguments for inflation targeting.   6
they are likely to benefit from the application of different decision heuristics (Hong and 
Page, 2004). 
     Having tentatively concluded that committees are (a) different and (b) probably better, 
I turn in the rest of the paper to issues of committee design. What kind of committee is 
likely to make the best monetary policy decisions? 
 
2. Types of monetary policy committees 
Committees differ along a number of dimensions. In this section, I deal briefly with 
five: the degree of consensus achieved (or enforced), the strength of the committee’s 
leader, the committee’s size, its composition between “insiders” (that is, full-time 
employees of the bank) and “outsiders,” and how committee members are selected. 
Degree of consensus 
In a series of papers beginning with Blinder et al. (2001), I have suggested the 
following three-way classification of MPCs. An individualistic committee is founded on 
the principle of individual accountability. It does not worry terribly much about achieving 
consensus, but rather makes decisions by something approximating true majority vote. It 
also often speaks with multiple voices. The Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank 
seem to be two examples of this stereotype. By contrast, a collegial committee is founded 
on the principle of group accountability. It strives for a consensus decision that everyone 
on the committee can embrace, and it may or may not hold a formal vote. Such a 
committee generally speaks (figuratively, if not literally) with a single voice.  
I have further suggested subdividing collegial committees into two types, according 
to how the consensus is achieved. On an autocratically-collegial committee, the   7
chairman more or less dictates the consensus, and the other members fall in line. The 
FOMC under Chairmen Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan (but not, it seems, Bernanke) 
were clear examples.
6 On a genuinely-collegial committee, the chairman is less dominant. 
Members basically agree in advance to reach a group decision, and then they accept the 
result even if they are not entirely happy with it. The ECB Governing Council is the most 
prominent contemporary example of this type. 
Which system works best? There is probably not a single answer that works for all 
times and places. But I suggested in Blinder (2004) that an individualistic committee is 
probably best suited to exploiting the advantages of committees over individuals—if it 
can solve the “cacophony problem” of speaking with too many (possibly conflicting) 
voices. Toward that end, it may be wise to throw a dash of (genuine) collegiality into the 
mix. 
Does strong leadership improve decisionmaking? 
In choosing among individualistic, genuinely-collegial, and autocratically-collegial 
committee structures, one important consideration is how important it is to have a strong 
leader.
7 Almost by definition, the committee chairman has the most power in an 
autocratically-collegial committee and the least in an individualistic committee, with 
genuinely-collegial committees somewhere in between. But which arrangement leads to 
the best performance? 
There is no simple answer to this question. I have just suggested, on conceptual 
grounds, that something between an individualistic and a genuinely-collegial committee 
structure might be optimal. That blend would seem to imply having a chairman who does 
                                                 
6 FOMC votes do allow for dissenters, however. 
7 Heads of MPCs are variously called chairman (Fed), governor (BoE), or president (ECB). To economize 
on words, I’ll employ the American usage: chairman.   8
not dominate the proceedings. But even that tentative conclusion could easily be 
overturned by evidence that an MPC needs a strong leader in order to function well. Is 
there such evidence? 
It is possible to read the good track records of the Fed under, e.g., Volcker and 
Greenspan, and of the Bundesbank under, e.g., Poehl and Tietmeyer, as evidence in favor 
of this proposition. Indeed, the Fed has a longstanding tradition of dominance by its 
chairman. But it appears that the ECB, during its short history to date, has not been 
dominated by its two presidents—and yet has performed quite well. And the highly-
successful Bank of England MPC has even seen its chairman, Mervyn King, on the losing 
side of votes. So real-world “data” do not speak to this question with any clear voice. 
 John Morgan and I (Blinder and Morgan, 2007) recently attacked the leadership 
issue experimentally. We found, much to our surprise, that ersatz MPCs comprised of 
Berkeley students did not achieve higher scores when they had designated leaders versus 
when they did not. Whether this laboratory result applies to real-world MPCs is an 
open—and important—question which Blinder and Morgan (2007) discuss extensively. 
But resolving it econometrically seems a daunting (possibly impossible) task. 
Committee size 
Real world MPCs vary greatly in size, ranging from a low of three members (at the 
Swiss National Bank) to a high of 19 (both the Federal Reserve and the ECB), and the 
ECB’s Governing Council will soon grow even larger. Table 1 shows the size distribution 
the size of monetary policy committees specified by law across a wide range of central 
banks. While the distribution is quite spread out, there appears to be a pretty strong mode 
in the 7-to-9 member range.   9
Table 1 
Size Distribution of Central Bank Policy Boards 
 











3 or fewer  4  11  5 or fewer  23 
4-6 28  21  6-10  67 
7-9   50  49  11 or more  10 
10-12 10 13     
13 or more  8  6     
Source: Columns (1)-(2) come from Lybek and Morris (2004, Table 5), based on a 
sample of 50 central banks. Columns (1) and (3) come from Erhart and Vasquez-Paz 
(2007, Chart 1), based on a sample of 85 central banks. Columns (4)-(5) come from Fry 
et al. (2000, Chart 7.4), based on a sample of 82 banks. 
 
What determines optimal—or even actual—MPC size? The answers likely depend 
on a number of factors, including: 
•  the committee’s composition. If you want different types of people (e.g., 
economists, bankers, businesspeople,…) on the committee, you will need a larger 
committee. (More on this below.) 
•  the desired degree of consensus, which I have just discussed. It is probably easier 
to achieve consensus with a smaller committee. 
•  the size of the country. Especially is there is rapid turnover among board 
members, small countries with large committees may find themselves exhausting 
the available talent pool. 
•  the nature of the government that appoints it. For example, the multi-national 
character of the ECB probably dictated a large committee, as did the dispersed 
federal structure of the United States in 1913. 
 A cross-sectional empirical study of actual (not necessarily optimal) committee size by 
Berger et al. (2006) found that MPCs tend to have more members in larger and more   10
heterogeneous countries, those with democratic institutions, and those with flexible 
exchange rates. All this makes sense. Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007) also find that larger 
country size leads to larger MPC size, as does more volatile GDP; but they reverse 
Berger et al.’s finding on the exchange rate regime. 
Suppose the advantages of group decisionmaking derive largely from sharing 
information and employing different heuristics. If information sharing were literally 
costless and devoid of coordination problems, bigger committees would necessarily be 
better.
8 But the implied enthusiasm for large size needs to be tempered by several 
mitigating factors. Obviously, coordination problems arise in very large committees; even 
the sharing of information and opinions can become cumbersome. In addition, as just 
noted, if consensus is deemed important, very large committees may find that goal 
elusive. (However, the Fed and the ECB seem to find the task manageable.) 
Blinder and Morgan (2007) tested the performance of four-member versus eight-
member committees in an experimental setting, and found very small differences in either 
strategy or performance. (A slight edge went to the larger committees, though it was 
generally not statistically significant.) Sibert (2006) suggested, only half tongue-in-cheek, 
that five-person committees are optimal. If she is right, Table 1 implies that most MPCs 
are too large. Alternatively, Table 1 can be taken to suggest that Sibert is wrong. 
Committee membership 
What sorts of people should sit on a monetary policy committee? One part of the 
answer is simple: Since we want central banks to be independent, monetary policy should 
be made by technocrats, not by politicians. So members of the government should not be 
on the MPC. But beyond that, what can we say? 
                                                 
8 The Condorcet jury theorem, if taken literally, suggests extremely large committees.   11
Some of my fellow economists believe the answer is simple. Contrary to the old 
adage that war is too important to be left to the generals, they believe that monetary 
policy should be made by a bunch of skilled, technical economists who know how to 
minimize the expected value of a quadratic loss function subject to a linear, stochastic 
model—people like Ben Bernanke, Mervyn King, Stanley Fischer, and Lars Svensson, to 
name a few real-world examples. I hate to dissent from this self-satisfied view, and in 
some sense I don’t. And besides, the real-world trend does appear to be moving in that 
direction.
9  
However, before we macroeconomists become too smug, let me point out two things. 
First, if you believe that the main benefits from having decisions made by a committee 
(rather than by an individual) derive from different ways of thinking, then having only 
Ph.D. macroeconomists may not be the best recipe. Second, concentrating on 
accomplished research economists retroactively would have eliminated both Paul 
Volcker, who was a government official for many years, and Alan Greenspan, who was a 
business economist with tight political connections, while letting in the distinguished 
academic, Arthur Burns. So, happy as I am to see my brilliant friend Ben Bernanke at the 
helm of the Fed, I don’t necessarily believe that publishing a lot of notable scholarly 
work on monetary economics is the best possible credential for a central banker. 
Neither, of course, did the founders of the Federal Reserve, which has the world’s 
oldest central bank committee. The Federal Reserve Act (1913) directs the President of 
the United States to appoint the seven-person Board of Governors in Washington with 
                                                 
9 When President Bill Clinton appointed me as Vice Chairman of the Fed in 1994, I believe I was only 
about the fourth or fifth career academic (depending on how you define that term) to be appointed to the 
board in its 80 year history. Since then, there have been seven more academics out of 12 new appointments. 
This looks like a regime change to me.   12
“due regard to a fair representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and 
commercial interests, and geographical divisions of the country.” That doesn’t sound 
much like a description of the NBER macro group to me. Appointments of the 12 district 
bank presidents are even more complicated since each is chosen (with the approval of the 
Board of Governors) by the bank’s board of directors: a nine-person body comprised of 
three directors “chosen by and representative of the stockholding banks,” three directors 
“designated by the Board of Governors… with due but not exclusive consideration to the 
interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor and consumers,” and three 
members “who shall represent the public” and are to be chosen with those same interest 
groups in mind. Whew!  
In short, the founders of the Fed sought to entrust its decisions—no one in 1913 
would have called it “monetary policy”—to “men of affairs”—no one was thinking of 
women then--with a broad variety of life experiences and points of view. The Maastricht 
Treaty, which came almost 80 years later, placed more faith in the virtues of specialists. It 
specified that ECB Executive Board members should be “persons of recognized standing 
and professional experience in monetary or banking matters.”  
In thinking about the choice between technical monetary economists and others, it is 
worth pointing out that each member of the Fed’s Open Market Committee and of the 
ECB’s Governing Council has other duties to perform, apart from monetary policy. And 
specialists in monetary economics probably have no particular comparative advantage in, 
say, bank supervision or administration. Nor are the Fed and the ECB unusual in this 
respect; giving central bankers multiple roles is the norm, not the exception.
10 And my 
own experience on the Federal Reserve Board taught me that it is useful to have 
                                                 
10 The Bank of England’s MPC seems to be the most prominent exception.   13
colleagues with more experience in banking, and in financial business in general, than 
academics normally have—even if they don’t understand linear-quadratic models.  
     The fact that most central bankers perform a variety of tasks leads to a related 
question: Should all members of the MPC be officers of the bank (“insiders”), or is it 
better to have some “outsiders” who have specialized knowledge of monetary policy? 
Practices in this regard clearly vary. The British MPC is explicitly divided into five 
internal and four external members. At the Fed, all 19 FOMC members are “insiders,” as 
long as you count the 12 district bank presidents that way (as you should). In fact, a 
number of the presidents are typically Fed careerists, whereas relatively few governors in 
Washington are.
11 The ECB’s insider-outsider structure is less clear. The six-member 
Executive Board works at headquarters in Frankfurt, but they are not ECB careerists. The 
other members of the Governing Council are the heads of the 13 constituent national 
central banks—a mix of careerists (at their own institutions) and non-careerists.  
     Which mix works best? I find this a hard question to answer. On the one hand, real 
benefits—such as the avoidance of group-think—accrue from bringing fresh, diverse 
points of view into the committee room. That observation suggests including some 
outsiders who are less loyal to the bank’s party line; and indeed, outsiders do dissent 
more frequently than insiders on the British MPC.
12 On the other hand, I find it hard to 
see how a part-time outsider, who is still pursuing some other occupation, can fully 
insulate him- or herself from what might be called incidental conflicts of interest (e.g., 
everyone is affected by interest rates) and/or from making news inadvertently while 
outside the cocoon of the central bank. So if there are to be “outsiders” on an MPC, they 
                                                 
11 At present, the only one is Donald Kohn. And he is the first in decades. 
12 See, among others, Gerlach-Kristen (2007). District bank presidents also dissent more frequently than 
governors on the FOMC. See Meade and Sheets (2005).   14
should be full-time public servants.
13 The Fed’s practice of regularly appointing non-
careerists to the (full-time) Board of Governors may be one reasonable way to balance 
these two considerations. 
     Appointed by whom? 
     Methods of appointment to monetary policy committees also vary widely across 
central banks. I just mentioned that seven of the members of the FOMC are appointed by 
the President of the United States. But 12 are not. Similarly, six members of the ECB’s 
Governing Council are appointed “by common accord” of the heads of government, 
while the other 13 are appointed by national authorities—in a variety of ways. In the UK, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer appoints the entire MPC. 
     Here I do have a clear opinion. To imbue policymakers with political legitimacy, and 
for the sake of democratic accountability (which is related), I believe it is important that 
policymakers be appointed by the politically-responsible authorities. That could mean 
either the president or prime minister (or, as in the British case, his agent) or the 
legislature or parliament. But it rules out self-perpetuating oligarchies. 
     This view may seem to undermine the doctrine of central bank independence, but I 
think it does not. Certainly in a democracy, central bank independence cannot be 
absolute. There must, for example, be some ultimate political check on the authority of 
the central bank—for example, by giving the elected government the ability to take back 
some of the central bank’s power under extreme circumstances.
14 But since this “nuclear 
option” will rarely, if ever, be invoked, it seems wise to have some milder way to 
                                                 
13 Making all members full-timers, incidentally, probably implies giving them others tasks to perform 
because thinking about monetary policy is probably not a full-time job—as long as the central bank has 
ample staff resources.  
14 On this, see Lohmann (1992).  In the US case, extreme circumstances are not even required. The 
Congress can end the Federal Reserve’s independence any day it chooses.   15
mitigate the “democracy deficit.” Giving the power to appoint central bank officials to 
politicians who win elections seems a good option. 
 
3. Committees and communication 
     In a recent paper (Blinder, 2007), I made a fairly obvious point, but one that seems not 
to have been made before: Because monetary policy committees are so different, they 
probably need to communicate in different ways. In particular, central banks with 
individual decisionmakers, autocratically-collegial committees, genuinely-collegial 
committees, and individualistic committees probably each need different styles of 
communication. A few examples will illustrate why.
15 
     Start with the statement released immediately following a monetary policy meeting 
and the subsequent release of the minutes. I pair these two because, in a real sense, they 
are substitutes. 
     An autocratically-collegial committee should be capable of delivering a pretty 
detailed, coherent explanation of its action immediately. After all, the chairman almost 
certainly knew the outcome before the meeting started. If the statement is sufficiently 
long and detailed, there is less need for detailed minutes and no rush to produce them. 
The minutes will not contain much market-relevant information, anyway. 
     But things may be quite different at the end of a meeting of a genuinely-collegial 
committee. First, the chairman may not have known the outcome of the meeting in 
advance, which clearly would have prevented him from drafting an explanatory statement 
prior to the meeting. And drafting a detailed statement in real time is a real challenge. 
Second, while the committee members may agree on the decision, they may not all agree 
                                                 
15 For more details, see Blinder (2007, pp. 116-120).   16
on the reasoning behind it.
16 If so, issuing a detailed statement right after the meeting 
may be quite difficult, leaving a terse statement as the only viable alternative. In such 
cases, the minutes assume greater importance and need to be released sooner and to be 
more detailed. 
     The immediate communication problem is even more acute for an individualistic 
committee, whose decisions are apt to be non-unanimous. Even when everyone votes the 
same way, members are likely to disagree over the rationales. In a situation like that, 
agreeing on an immediate explanatory statement might prove impossible. In the absence 
of such a statement, the entire burden of explanation falls on the minutes, which must 
therefore be quite detailed and should be released in short order. 
     A second example is the disclosure of forward-looking information, up to and 
including a projection of future central bank decisions—which the central banks of New 
Zealand, Norway, and Sweden now publish. In principle, this task is far easier for an 
individual central banker acting alone, or for an autocratically-collegial committee, than 
it is for either of the other two types. The chairman of an autocratically-collegial 
committee presumably has a good idea of what he is likely to do in the future, and he can 
reveal information about it if he so chooses. Late in his tenure as Fed chairman, Alan 
Greenspan did this regularly, albeit in his own stylized way. 
     The chairman of a genuinely-collegial committee is in a less commanding position. 
When decisions are tough, he may not be able to predict with much confidence where the 
committee is headed, nor when. And other committee members almost certainly will not 
want him to close off their future options. Since no central bank can be expected to reveal 
what it does not know, such a committee may be limited to offering only vague 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the true rationale for some members might be “because everyone else wanted to.”    17
indications of its “bias” or perceived “balance of risks,” which is what the ECB and the 
Fed typically do. 
     Revealing forward-looking information is, of course, most difficult for an 
individualistic committee, where members not only may but probably do hold different 
views on where monetary policy should be heading—some of which may have been 
made public. Agreement on future plans certainly cannot be revealed if it cannot be 
reached. On the other hand, the votes of an individualistic committee may be much more 
informative than the votes of collegial committees. They should therefore be published 
immediately, naming names. 
     The size of the committee may also affect an MPC’s communication strategy. While 
the difficulties are often exaggerated, it is harder for a larger group to agree on wording. 
Indeed, this appears to be a current problem for the 19-member FOMC, which issues a 
brief statement after each meeting. Even though these statements are terse and stylized, 
committee members reportedly have a hard time agreeing on the wording—leading to the 
exchange of numerous drafts. It could be that, say, a 500-word statement is simply 
beyond the FOMCs capabilities. Of course, this conundrum, if it is genuine, does raise a 
chicken-egg issue. I have spoken as if the decision on committee size dictates some 
aspects of the communication policies. But if a monetary policy committee is too large to 
communicate clearly, effectively, and honestly, maybe it is too large. 
 
4. Whose forecasts? 
  One type of information that most central banks release, at least occasionally and 
partially, are forecasts of key macroeconomic variables such as inflation, unemployment,   18
and output (or even output gaps). When decisions on monetary policy are made, whether 
by an individual or a committee, forecasts of the outlook under both changed and 
unchanged monetary policy are among the most crucial inputs. So, in the interest of 
transparency, it seems entirely appropriate for central banks to release those forecasts.  
  That said, committee decisionmaking raises some specific, and vexing, issues. For 
starters, whose forecast should be released? A first distinction is between forecasts of the 
committee, if they exist, and forecasts of the central bank staff. To the extent that they 
differ, the former are presumably more tightly linked to policy decisions than the latter. 
So let’s start there. 
In what sense can a committee, especially a large committee like the FOMC or the 
ECB Governing Council, actually be said to make a numerical forecast, especially a 
detailed one? This is a good question, and the answer is related to some of the issues 
raised earlier: how large should the MPC be?, what sorts of people should be on it?, etc. 
At the technical level, macroeconomic forecasting is almost always done in teams. 
So a relatively small MPC comprised of technically-minded economists should be able to 
develop a forecast and “own it” collectively. In that case, the MPCs forecast is surely the 
right one to release. But if the committee is large and/or if its members lack expertise in 
macroeconomics and forecasting, agreement on the forecast can become either elusive or 
illusory—perhaps both. 
Current FOMC forecasts, which are released twice a year in conjunction with the 
Fed’s semi-annual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, are a good example. The 
published committee forecasts are supposed to represent the range and central tendency 
(whatever that means) of the forecasts submitted by each of the 19 FOMC members. But   19
members never meet (nor even email) to try to iron out (or even understand) the 
differences among their forecasts. Instead, they each generate forecasts under their own 
favorite (and often unstated) assumptions about exogenous variables such as oil prices, 
government spending, and foreign economic growth. They even make their own 
assumptions about future monetary policy! Oh, and by the way, while the district bank 
presidents each have large staffs to do their forecasting work, the governors in 
Washington (other than the chairman) do not. 
The resulting “FOMC forecasts” are a curious hodge-podge which are hard to 
interpret and which may have little relevance to actual monetary policy decisions. Could 
the forecast exercise be done better? I am sure the answer is yes.
17 But the fact remains 
that a 19-member committee will have a hard time agreeing on a long list of numbers, 
even if most of them are Ph.D. economists, as is true on the FOMC today. If you add a 
bunch of people who carry dramatically different intellectual baggage into the room, 
agreement may become even more elusive. In such cases, the staff forecast might be a 
sensible focal point. 
 
5. A Summing Up 
It seems likely that more thinking has gone into the question of what a monetary 
policy committee should look like over the last decade than over the preceding century. 
While we have not yet reached agreement on everything, and may never do so, one way 
to sum up this talk is ask what might be considered “best practice” right now. If you were 
a country currently thinking about redesigning its monetary policy apparatus—as Norway 
                                                 
17 Indeed, the FOMC under Bernanke’s leadership is now trying to change the process to make the FOMC 
forecasts more meaningful.   20
did in 2001—what sort of monetary policy committee would you design? Posing this 
question is probably also a good way to get the workshop’s debate rolling. 
To begin with, I think you would choose to have a MPC rather than a single 
policymaker. The weight of theory and evidence—plus, of course, international 
precedent—points strongly in that direction. The optimal size for your MPC is less clear. 
While 7-9 members seems to be the most popular choice around the world, a small 
country might find it challenging to staff a committee of, say, nine, especially if turnover 
is rapid.
18 You also must not make the committee so large that it finds it difficult to 
communicate clearly and in some detail. As I have mentioned, your communication 
strategy—including the type of forecast you publish—needs to be custom-tailored to the 
nature and structure of your committee. 
In terms of committee type, I believe you would try to strike a balance between the 
virtues of diversity that are the hallmark of an individualistic committee and the clarity of 
communication that is the virtue of a genuinely-collegial committee—that is, wind up 
somewhere between the Bank of England and the ECB. The need for diversity suggests 
that not all members should be specialists in monetary economics. The virtues of 
collegiality, plus the research I have mentioned, suggest that it is not essential to have a 
dominant chairman. 
All committee members should be appointed by the government, although precisely 
what that means must depend on the details of the country’s system of governance.
19 I 
also believe that every MPC member should be a full-time employee of the central 
bank—which is certainly the international norm. However, it is probably best if bank 
                                                 
18 The UK, which is not a small country, has had foreign nationals and foreign residents on its MPC. 
19 In the US, it would mean presidential appointment with Senate approval, which is how governors in 
Washington, but not district bank presidents, are appointed.   21
careerists constitute only a minority of the committee’s membership. (This is a safeguard 
against group-think.) A committee comprised of a healthy blend of monetary policy 
specialists and others is probably advisable in most cases.
20 
Many of you are now probably mulling over how your own country’s MPC stacks up 
against this abstract “best practice” standard. In the case of the United States, the 
comparison looks pretty favorable to the FOMC, but with four exceptions. First, the Fed 
chairman may have been too dominant, and the committee too passive, historically. 
Interestingly, Ben Bernanke seems to be changing that. Second, a 19-member committee 
is probably too large. Third, only a minority of the FOMC membership is politically 
appointed. And fourth, the Fed does not communicate often or clearly enough. 
It need hardly be said that all of these judgments of what constitutes best practice are 
tentative, based partly on the research to date and partly on experience. Further research 
may temper or even overturn some of them. And more research is certainly needed—
starting with this workshop, which I applaud the Bank of Norway for holding. 
 
                                                 
20 A notable exception would be if monetary policy is the committee’s sole responsibility.   22
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